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THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST*
CHARLEs E. CLARK and ROBERT M. HUTCHmNS
Ever since the adoption of the original New York Code of 1848 it
has been a fundamental requirement .of code pleading that every action
should be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, with
an exception in favor of an executor or administrator, a trustee of anexpress trust or a person expressly authorized by statute.' The framers
of the Code, in explaining the occasion for the provision, referred tothe common law prohibition against the assignment of a "thing in
action" and stated this to be the condition of the parties: "If the
assignee sues at law, he is turned Out of -court, and if the assignor suesin equity, he is turned out also." They added: "The true rule undoubt-
edly is that which prevails in the courts of equity, that he who has the
right, is the person to pursue the remedy. We have adopted that
rule." 2
The provision in question has received comparatively little attention
from commentators, but has been the subject of widely diverse opinionin the courts. It is believed that a discussion of the problems raisedby it in perhaps its two most striking aspects-assignments of chosesin action and subrogation-in relation to its historical background and
to its connection with the general purpose of the code may serve to
clarify it.
PARTIES PLAINTIFF IN COMMON LAW AND EQUITY PLEADING
The common law judges recognized as plaintiff only one whose legat
right had been affected by the act of the defendant. A plaintiff must
show that he possessed the legal right in controversy, or else he
must sue in the name of one who had that. right.8 The plaintiff could
not stie unless the common law gave him a right of action for the
defendant's breach; the defendant must be a person who could be sued
in the particular form of action selected. The claim recognized at law
was a relatively narrow one, and took no account of the large body of
relations termed equitable. This principle was applied so rigidly that
* The substance of this article will appear as part of a text on Code Pleading
to be published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.1N. Y. Laws, 1848, ch. 379, sec. 91; cf. N. Y. C. P. A. 1920, sec. 2o.'First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, N. Y. 1848, 124.
They say further that the rule "will be found in the form in which we have statedit, in Field v. Maghee, 5 Paige, 539; Rogers v. Traders' Ins. Co., 6 Paige, 598;and Miles v. Hoag, 7 Paige, 21."
'Anderson v. Martindale (i8o1, K. B3.) I Fast, 497; Randoll v. Bell (183,K. B.) I M. & S. 722; I Chitty, Pleadings (i6th Am. ed. 1879) I.
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in tort actions the only plaintiff .was the person wronged, and the only
defendant the per.son who. did the wrong ;4 while in contract actions
in general only the parties to the contract could be parties to a suit
upon it. 5
In theory the general principle of the courts of law was to disregard
equitable interests.6  Theref ore one having an equitable interest could
sue at law only in the name of the person having the legal title. The
history of the attempt of the assignee of a chose in action to sue at
law in his own name is illuminating. 7  The common law judges fre-
quently announced that choses in action were not assignable.8 What-
ever might be the view of equity, the legal title remained in the assignor.
He and he only could sue. But very early the assignee obtained per-
mission to bring his action in his assignor's name,9 and was soon held
authorized to use the assignor's name in all legal proceedings. 0  Thus
while the theory of the common law that only one having the legal
right could sue was never relinquished, a practical invasion of the rule
occurred-an invasion which was not permitted in the case of cestuis
que trustent or of those having equitable interests in land."
In equity, on the other hand, many parties appeared who could not
sue at law.12  The Chancellor required of parties only that they have
a material interest in the suit; that interest could be legal or beneficial.
The person having the legal title to the "res" in controversy was gen-
erally a necessary party to the bill, so that 'the legal title might be
bound by the decree. 3  But the interest of the assignor of a debt was
so nebulous that in equity the assignee alone could appear.Y4 Thus
"among the earliest petitions (in chancery) preserved we find assignees
seeking to recover in their own names debts assigned to them.'' 15
'Story v. Richardson (x839, C. P.) 6 Bing. N. Cas. 123; Dicey, Rules for the
Selection of the Parties to an Action (2d Am. ed. 1886) 78; I Chitty, op. cit. 69.6Anderson v. Martindale, supra note 3; Eccleston v. Clipshain (I65o, K. B.)
153; I Chitty, op. cit. 2.
8 Dicey, op. cit. 56; see also i Chitty, op. cit. 2, 3.
'See Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 816;
(917) 3o ibid. 449; Williston, Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action
Legal or Equitable. (I916) 30 ibid. 97, 99; see also infra, p. 263 ff.
sCook, op. cit. 29 HARV. L. Rnv. 822.
Splidt v. Bowles (28o8 K. B.) io East, *278; Johnson v. Collings (18oo,
K. B.) i ibid. 98; I Chitty op. cit. I7.
"Moore v. Coughlin (1862, Mass.) 4 Allen, 335; Alsop v. Clines (1813, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) Io John. 395, aff'd "(1815, N. Y. Sen.) 13 John. 9; Newell v. Hanson
(1924, Vt.) 123 AtI. 208.
" Dicey, op. cit. 49, 51.
Story. Equity Pleading (8th ed. 1870) sec. 72; Rules of Practice for Courts
of Equity of the United States, no. 37, 57 L. Ed. 1643.
"Story, op. cit. sec. 153.
' Story, loc. cit.; Day v. Cmummings (1847) ig Vt. 496.
" Barbour, "History of Contract in Early English History," 4 Oxford Studies
in Social and Legal History (1914) IO8.
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Equity looked constantly at the substance rather than the form, and
ordered that suits be brought by or in the name of "the real party in
interest."1 6
THE CODE THEORY AS TO PARTIES PLAINTIFF
As we have seen, the framers of the first New York Code announced
that they had adopted the equity rule. The express language of the
Code was'1 7 that "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest, except that an executor or administrator or a
trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute,
may sue, without joining with him the person for whose benefit the
action is prosecuted. A person -with whom or in whose name a con-
tract is made for the benefit of another is a trustee of an express trust
within the meaning of this section." The clause as to third party con-
tractors was added in 1851 to remove "the practical inconvenience
arising from making the beneficial interest the sole test of the right to
sue, and which that section [as to express trusts] was intended to
obviate.""' It would seem that the section as to express trusts was not
altogether necessary to obviate that inconvenience. The real party in
interest provision has been construed, 19 and wisely, it is thought, as not
requiring the plaintiff to have the beneficial interest. One having a
naked legal title may be the real party in interest. In the light of this con-
struction, the permission to the trustee of an express trust to sue alone
seems to have been granted from a perhaps excessive desire to. pre-
serve the privilege of suit to that class of plaintiffs, and not because the
real party in interest could be only the person with .the beneficial
interest2o
The question remains: who is the real party in interest? The
answer supported by the cases is, as the Code Commissioners themselves
said, that the real party in interest is he who by substantive law has
the right of action. The codes were not intended to change substan-
10 Shipman, Equity Pleading (1897) sec. 17; Rules of Practice, no. 37, supra
note 12; Field v. Maghee (1836. N. Y. Ch.) 5 Paige *539.", Bliss' N. Y. C. C. P. 1913, sec. 449. The original code had the real party in
interest provision in sec. 91 and the exceptions in sec. 93, referring to them in sec.
91. See First Report of the Commissioners, supra note 2, pp. 123-125; see Hinton,
Cases on Code Pleading (2d ed. 1922) 122, note i; see also Clark, The Code
Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817, esp. note 2. In 1851 there
was added "but this section shall not be deemed to authorize the assignment of a
thing in action not arising out of contract." N. Y. Code, 1851, sec. iii. This
clause was omitted in later revisions.
"Wright. J., in Considerant v. Brisbane (186o) 22 N. Y. 389.
t, See discussion as to assignees for collection, etc., infra, p. 268.
' See discussion of the exception as to trustees, infra, p. 273.
The eagerness of the Commissioners to permit liberal joinder, as in equity, and
to settle all phases of a controversy in one suit may be noted on p. 124 of their
Report, supra note 2.
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tive law. Thus in this view whoever formerly had a legal or equitable
right of action has such right still. If it be objected that the assignor
of a chose in action has no longer any right of action, the reply is that
this change is more apparent than real. As we have already observed,2 '
the assignor, almost from the first, was merely a nominal plaintiff; he
had no right of action. His importance came only from the fact that
the actual plaintiff, the assignee, had to use his name to enforce the
assignee's right of action. The' aim of the codifiers was a unified
system of law and equity. If such a system were to be achieved, he
who was the real party in interest at law or in equity before the codes
must remain so under the combined procedure. Thus the change
induced by this section is formal only: a plaintiff who had been able to
sue at law in the name of another and in equity in his own name can now
sue in his own name before a court administering both law and equity.
22
In the case of contracts entered into for the benefit of third parties
there is not even a formal change .2  The third party beneficiary sues
where he is permitted to do so not because he is the real party in inter-
est, but because he has by the substantive law of the case a right of
action. The question is, as it always was: do the relations between
promisor and promisee create any right in the third party? Unless
they do, he is not the real party in interest. If they do, he does not
need this code provision to help him. It is substantially the same
question which must be asked in every case under this section. Did
the plaintiff formerly have a right of action at law or in equity? If
so, he may enforce it to-day; if not, he is no better off by reason of the
Code than he was before.
Even so, the interpretation of the section is not free from difficulty,
as is indicated by the discordant views of courts and writers on certain
points. Professor L. M. Simes has perhaps most clearly presented the
proper approach to the subject,24 though it is believed that he is in
error as to one feature of it. He emphasizes the old differences
between law and equity which would seem no longer to exist, and this
leads him to deprecate the fairly general rule that an insurer may sue
in his own name after payment as the subrogee of the insured's rights
against the tort feasor.25 The learned writer sees in such an action
the enforcement of rights both legal and equitable. The existence of
such rights he is unwilling to admit. Yet the blended system of law
and equity-the fundamental feature of the codes-leads inevitably to
that result. The essence of the union of law and equity under the
See supra, p. 26o.
i Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 446; Simes, The Real Party in Interest
(i921) io Ky. L. JOUR. 6o.=i Williston, loc. cit.; Simes, op. cit. 71; that the Code was at first believed
-to have changed the rule, see Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNA-, 1008, 1029.
Simes, op. cit. 6o.
Simes, op. cit. 63, 68, 69.
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codes 8 is that now one action may enforce a right which formerly
would have required a suit at law and a bill in equity. This is exactly
the insurance company's case. Here are involved the legal claim for
damages and the equitable theory of subrogation. Before the codes
two suits, one at law and one in equity, would have been necessary;
but under the reformed procedure there is but one jural right to dam-
ages, and that right is in the insurer.
Such a conclusion does not endanger the constitutional guarantee of
jury trial. Though the necessity of jury trial in some cases may be
admitted, it need not he regarded as settling all pleading questions.
After the pleadings have been closed, the selection of the tribunal
required should be made according to the issue found. If that issue
is one which was formeily triable by jury, it should go to the jury;
otherwise the court may try the case.2 7  Where an insurance company
sues in its own name, the issue of negligence should go to the jury;
the issue of subrogation, which was purely equitable, should go to the
court, unless he sees fit to order a jury trial. It seems that generally
in subrogation cases the jury is present, since there are two issues.
There was the legal issue of the creditor against the debtor and the
equitable issue of the subrogee against the creditor, a relation some-
what similar to a constructive trust,28 which the subrogee may enforce
against the creditor.29 Though there is but one cause of action, 0 there
are two issues, and the jury may be present through the trial of both.
There is no longer any occasion for the insured-who has no interest
in the case--to be a party, real or formal.
THE ASSIGNEE OF A CHOSE IN ACTION AS PLAINTIFF
In discussing the application of the real party in interest clause
we naturally begin with the point to which it was obviously directed:
the assignment of choses in action.31 Modem statutes have practically
done away with the common law prohibitions against such transfers.
As Professor Throckmorton has put it: "Assignability of choses in
action is now the rule and nonassignability the exception. 3 2
A late North Carolina case states the prevailing view as to contract
rights: "Unless expressly prohibited by statute or in contravention of
some principle of public policy, all ordinary business contracts are
assignable, and actions for the breach of the same can be maintained
'Cf. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity (Jan. 1925) 25 COL. L. REv. no. L
See Cook, Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 645; CoMMTsrs
(1923) 32 ibid. 7o7.
5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprud.we (2d ed. 1892) sec. 2343.
Loc. cit. sec. 2349.
' See Gaugler v. Chicago Ry. (1912, D. Mont.) 79, 82. where the court says indealing with a case, "there is but a single cause of action involved."
'See supra, p. 268.n5 C. J. 849-50.
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by the assignee in his own name." 3  Except as to purely personal con-
tracts, this is the usual rule.34 Claims arising from torts are generally
transferable unless the tort was done to the person, feelings, or reputa-
tion of the assignor. The customary test is that of survival. If the
right of action would, at the death of its original owner, pass to his
personal representative, it is assignable. 35 It should be noted, however,
that the codes of procedure do not in any sense regulate the assigrf-
ment of debts. They determine solely the procedural point: who shall
sue when an assignment has been validly made? What constitutes a
valid assignment remains a question of substantive law as much to-day
as at common law.36
When such an assignment has been made of an entire debt,37 the
assignee may sue in his own name as the real party in interest under the
Code.38 This is so whether the assignment would formerly have been
denominated legal or equitable. 39 Thus an assignee who has a right of
action which he formerly could have enforced in his own name in equity
and in his assignor's at law, may under the combined procedure enforce
that right in his own name.
So it would seem that an assignee who has no beneficial interest,
like an assignee for collection only, may prosecute an action in his own
name, and many, probably most, American jurisdictions have so
held.40 It is thought that courts refusing to permit such an action41
'High Point Casket Co. v. Wheeler (1921) i82 N. C. 459, 1O9 S. E. 378.
"The exceptions are collected in 4 Cyc. 9, note ii. The statement in the text
follows the usual form of expression of the rule. A more exact analysis would
indicate that a "contract" as a whole cannot be assigned; that contractual duties
cannot be thus escaped, while contractual rights may be transferred, though per-
sonal performance by the assignor of specified acts may be a condition precedent
to the enforcement of such rights.
- See 5 C. J. 85o, 4 Cyc. 23.
" Thons-Bonner Co. v. Hooven (192o, S. D. Ohio) 284 Fed. 377; as to
assignability generally see i Williston, Contracts, supra note 22, secs. 4o4-447, and
cases collected in 5 C. J. 849-897.
"Why negotiable instruments do not raise the questions as to plaintiffs brought
up by assignments is too well known to require comment here. See Norton, Bills
and Notes (4th ed. 1914) 18, ig, 21; N. I. L. sec. I (4); Trustees of Union
College v. Wheeler (1874) 61 N. Y. 88.
' Walker v. Mauro (1853) 18 Mo. 564; Thomas-Bonner Co. v. Hooven, supra
note 36 (Wis. and Ohio Codes); Denman v. Richardson (1921, W. D. Wash.)
284 Fed. 592; Tennent v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1908) 133 Mo. App. 345,
112 S. W. 754; Seybolt v. Waters (1922) lo9 Neb. 99, 189 N. W. 980.
'Note 33 supra; Bowser v. Hines (1922, Ind.) 137 N. E. 57; Puterbaugh v.
McCray (1914) 25 Calif. App. 469, 144 Pac. 149; for the common law rule see
Farmers' Exchange v. Lowney Co. (1923, Vt.) 115 At. 507.
" The Raupert City (914, W. D. Wash.) 213 Fed. 263; Ralph v. Anderson
(1921) 187 Calif. 45, 20o Pac. 94o; Manley v. Park (19o4) 68 Kan. 400, 75 Pac.
557. overruling Stewart v. Price (19o2) 64 Kan. 191, 67 Pac. 553; Webb v.
Morgan & Co. (I85I) 14 Mo. 305; cf. Spencer v. Standard Chemical & Metals
Corp. (924) 237 N. Y. 479, 143 N. E. 651, infra note 117.
I Moses v. Ingram (893) 99 Ala. 483, 12 So. 374 (partial code state) ; Bostwick
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are attempting to decide a question of substantive law by means of a
statute whose purpose was the reform of procedure. The. only point
at issue is whether at law or equity the assignee without beneficial inter-
est acquired any right of action. If he did, he may enforce it under
the codes as a real party in interest. Says one learned writer :42
"The camouflage of a simulated transfer cannot make the transferee
the real party in interest-with all due respect to the decisions which
under a forced construction hold otherwise." But, of course, if the
camouflage of a simulated transfer did make the transferee the real
party in interest before the codes, it has the same effect to-day. The
codes intend to alter procedure, not substantive rights. So it would
seem that one having a naked legal title, or an agent for collection only,
may be a real party in interest.43
ASSIGNOR AS PLAINTIFF
Similarly, the assignor's position, while theoretically changed, is in
effect the same as it was under the old practice. The only difference is
that the real party in interest clause has eliminated his name-his per-
son was already gone-from the proceedings."' The assignor had no
control over the action at common law ;45 he has none under the codes.46
It is true that the same result is not reached in some states whose
practice acts are not identical with the New York Code and in some
of the "common law" jurisdictions. For example, the assignor aftercomplete assignment may sue in Connecticut as retaining the legal
title.4 7 In Delaware his name must be used at law when the debt is
v. Bryant (1888) 113 Ind. 448, 16 N. E. 378; Brown v. Ginn (igoz) 66 Ohio St
316, 64 N. E. 123; see also Kerr. Pleading and Practice (i919) sec. 586; 64
L. R. A. 581.
For the bearing of Conn. Gen. Sts. I9z8, sec. 5655 on this point see Devine v.
Warner (I9o3) 76 Conn. 229, 234, 235, 56 Atl. 562.
*' Kerr, loc. cit.'Morrison v. Veach (1923) i9o Calif. 5o7, 213 Pac. 945; Greene v. McAuley
(I905) 70 Kan. 6oi, 79 Pac. 133;' Anderson v. Reardon (i8gi) 46 Minn. I85, 48
N. W. 777; Dyer v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co. (ig, Wash.) 179 Pac. 834.
"Thomas-Bonner Co. v. Hooven, supra note 36; Gay v. Orcutt (I9O2) I69 Mo.
400, 69 S. W. 295; Whiting v. Glass (1916) 2,7 N. Y. 333, I1 N. E. lO82, revers-
ing i6o App. Div. 915, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1149; and see Anmsler v. Cage (1923,
Tex. Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 669.
' Legh v. Legh (1799, C. P.) i Bos. & P. 447; Payne v. Rogers (78o, K. B)
I Dougl. 407; Newell v. Hanson, supra note o.
MGay v. Orcutt, supra note 44.
"Smith v. Waterbury Tramiway Co. (3923) 99 Conn. 446, 121 At. 873; the
practice goes back to a statute of 1864 permitting the equitable and bona fideholder of a chose in action to sue. This was not changed by the'adoption of the
Code in 1879. Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 5655.
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not assignable by statute.48  Suit in his name may, and in certain cases,
must be brought in Georgia, Maine, Michigan, and West Virginia. 9
The real party in interest provision is, however, properly construed in
most states as imperative; the assignee and he alone may sue.
PARTIAL ASSIGNMENTS
Applying the same principle, that the Code did not change substan-
tive law, to partial assignments, we find the question of parties plain-
tiff to actions thereon much simplified. At common law only the
assignor of part of a claim could sue for its recovery. The assignee
apparently had no standing even if suing inthe name of the assignor
or if joined with him.50 Many cases support this view.51 The reason
for the rule as stated by Story, J. in Mandeville v. Welch,52 is that a
debtor should not be subjected to many actions on one obligation;
"when he undertakes to pay an integral sum to his creditor, it is no part
of his contract that he shall be obliged to pay in fractions to other
persons."
In equity this reason failed. There the court could order all inter-
ested parties to be brought in as plaintiffs or defendants. Therefore
the Chancellor generally allowed the transferee to recover what was
due him by joining the transferor on one side or the other.58 As Mr.
Justice Holmes remarked in Richardson v. White,54 "There is no longer
any doubt that an assignment of part of a fund is good in equity."
"Illinois Finance Co. v. Interstate Rural Credit Assoc. (1917) II Del. Ch. 349,
:ioi Atl. 870.
Durrant Lumber Co. v. Sinclair Lumber Co. (1907) 2 Ga. App. 209, 58 S. E.
485; Rogers v. Brown (19o8) 103 Me. 478, 7o Atl. 206 (statute permissive);
Michigan Sugar Co. v. Moffett (1914) 183 Mich. 589, 149 N. W. 1025 (statute
-permissive) ; Miller v. Starcher (192o) 86 W. Va. 9o, 102 S. E. 809 (code held
to allow assignee to sue in own name or that of assignor).
For states requiring an assignment in writing, see Harvey v, Roberts (1923, Me.)
122 Atl. 4o9; New England Cabinet Works v. Morris (1917) 226 Mass. 246, 115
N. E. 315; Ovett Land Co. v. Wimberly (1915) 1O9 Miss. 6oi, 68 So. 855.
That the assignee may, in a code state, sue in his own name on a judgment
-recovered in his assignor's name in a common law jurisdiction, see Green v.
-Republic Fire Ins. Co. (I88I) 84 N. Y. 572.
' The remarks of Bourquin, J. in Gaugler v. C. M. & P. S. Ry. (1912, D.
Mont.) 197 Fed. 79, 84, "that at common law as assignor and his partial assignee
could join in an action at law in the name of the assignor" do not seem clear.
If they refer to a joinder of parties, they are erroneous.
" See Mandeville v. Welch (1820, U. S.) 5 Wheat. 277; Rogers v. Penobscot
Mining Co. (1907, C. C. A. 8th) 154 Fed. 6o6, 614; Thomas v. Mining Co. (I88o)
54 Calif. 578; Weinstock v. Bellwood (1876) 75 Ky. 139; Andrews Electric Co.
v. St. Alphonse Soc. (1919) 233 Mass. 20, 123 N. E. lO3.
" Supra note 5i.
"Andrews Electric Co. v. St. Alphonse Soc., supra note 51 ; Lanigan v. Bradley
Co. (1892) 5o N. J. Eq. 201; cf. Appeals of Philadelphia (1878) 86 Pa. 179, 182." (i896) 167 Mass. 58, 60, 44 N. E. io72, io73.
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The few cases which have not followed this intelligent rule seem influ-
enced by a narrow construction of equitable powers.55 The equity side
of the Federal courts has taken the more liberal view.58
Most code states have properly noted that to preserve the substan-
tive rights enjoyed by the partial assignee before the revision of pro-
cedure, the equitable rule and not the rigid regulation of the common
law must be adopted.. As pointed out by Andrews, J., in Risley v.
Phenix Bank,57 the code give the same facility for bringing in allthose concerned that obtained in chancery; he said, "The objection thatto allow an assignment of part of an entire Oaim might subject thedebtor to several actions "to eiforce a single obligation has much lessforce under a system which requires all parties in interest to be joined
as parties to the action." The same cotirt speaking through Parker,
C.J. in Chambers v. Lancaster"' said, "It has long been settled in thisstate that a valid assignment of a part of an entire debt can be made,
and ..... .the right of an assignee to bring suit on the equity sideof the court, making the assignor, as well as the debtor, a party hasfrequently been resorted to."59  This would seem a sensible rule. 'he
partial assignee should sue, because he could sue before the codes, but
for the protection of the debtor, the assignor should be made a partyplaintiff or defendant at the instance of the defendant. Most states
reach this result.5 0 In order to simplify the proceedings, however,defendant should be required to raise the point by demurrer or answer
that the assignor be made a party; otherwise the objection should beheld waived."- This rule as to waiver has been thought to be the NewYork view, on the authority of Dickinson v. Tyson;62 but the affirm-
'Burnett v. Crandall (1876) 63 Mo. 410; Pickett v. School District (i916) 193
Mo. App. 519, 526, 186 S. W. 533, 536.u'Rogers v. Penobscot Mining Co., supra note 5, at p. 614; Dulles v. Crippen
Mfg. Co. (i9q7, C. C. D. N. J.) 156 Fed. 706, 709; Fourth St. Bank v. Yardley(1896) i6j U. S. 634, 644, 17 Sup. Ct. 439, 440.
(i8gi) 83 N. Y. 318, 329.
(1899) i6o N. Y. 342, 348, 54 N. E. 7o7, 708."The notion, stated in Danners v. Lugar (1899, App. T.). 3o Misc. 98, 6I N. Y.Supp. 778, that the assignee may sue alone, since his assignor is estopped by theassignment seems to have gained no ground in New York; see notes 57 and 58
supra, and the New York cases cited infra.See notes 57 and s8 supra; also Martin v. Home (1922) ipo Calif. 202, 21HPac. 453; Campbell v. Holehan (I92o) 48 Calif. App. 568, 192 Pac. 121; Schillingv.'Mullen (1893) 55 Minn. 122, 56-N. W. 586; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.D. & R. G. R. R. (1913) 44 Utah, 26, 137 Pac. 653; Delaware County v. DieboldS. & L. Co. (i889) 133 U. S. 473, 10 Sup. Ct. 399 (Ind. Stat.). That the N. 3.Prac. Act, 1903, sec. 1g did not give this result, see Sternberg v. Lehigh ValleyR. R. (909) 78 N. J. L. 277. 73 Atl. 39, aff'd 8o N. J. L. 408, 78 Atl. 135.'Delaware County v. Diebold S. & L. Co., supra note 6o; Dickinson v. Tyson(i9o8, ist Dept.) 125 App. Div. 735, zio N. Y. Supp. 269; National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. D. & R. I. R. R., supra note 6o.
e Supra note 6r.
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ance,6 8 though without opinion, of the Appellate Division's decision
in Carvill v. Mirror Films6" is somewhat difficult to reconcile with it.
In that case the partial assignee sued in the municipal court, where the
pleadings are oral, and which, say the Appellate Division, has no "equit-
able jurisdiction." The defendant did not, until it was put in evidence
at the trial, know there had been an assignment. It was held that
under these circumstances defendant had not waived his objection that
the assignor should be a party, because he had had no opportunity to
register his objection. It is not easy to see why a motion to dismiss
when the transfer was put in evidence would not properly have put
forward defendant's objection and why, failing to make such motion,
he has not waived it. The dissenting opinion of Smith, J., and the
prevailing opinion of Bijur, J. in the court below 65 appear to state the
decidedly better view. Yet since the case under discussion recognizes
that wa.ver may take place by failure to make objection when there
is opportunity, it is at most a modification of the general principle.
These suggestions dispose also of the partial assignor. He is a real
party in interest and may prosecute an action as such. In order to
prevent splitting, and to settle the whole matter in one suit, the assignee
should be made a party on the timely objection of the debtor,66 this
objection to be waived unless seasonably made.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR COLLATERAL SECURITY
Professor Hepburn has expressed the opinion that assignments for
collateral security should rest on the same footing as partial assign-
ments.61  This reasoning would permit the assignee to sue only by
joining the assignor, assuming the defendant did not waive that objec-
tion, and would allow the assignor to sue if he made the assignee a
party. A recent Oklahoma case6s suggests a more satisfactory analogy.
There in holding the assignor for security not a necessary party to a
suit by the assignee, the court rest their decision on the similarity
between the transfer in suit and one under which, though absolute in
form, the transferee must account for the proceeds. This places the
assignee for security in the same class as the assignee for collection,
which is, it is submitted, the common conception of business men. Such
(IgIg) 226 N. Y. 683.
" (1917, ist Dept.) 178 App. Div. 644, 165 N. Y. Supp. 676, reversing 98 Misc.
650, 163 N. Y. Supp. 268.
' Supra note 64.
"See Wells v. Crawford (1912) 23 Colo. App. 103, 127 Pac. 914; Mclnnis
Lumber Co. v. Rather (x916) iII Miss. 55, 71 So. 264; contra: Cable v. St. Louis
M. Ry. & D. Co. (1885) 21 Mo. 133 (that the partiar assignee need not be
joined).
6130 Cyc. 51.
' Marker v. Gillam (1916) 54 OkI. 766. 154 Pac. 351, following Chicago, R. L
& P. R. R. v. Bankers' Nat. Bank- (1912) 32 Okla. 29o, i22 Pac. 499.
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assignments are thought to be absolute, 9 transferring the power to
prosecute an action thereupon in the assignee's own name. This view
makes for convenience and simplicity in business transactions. In con-
formity with it, many code states refuse to allow the assignor to appear
as plaintiff; the assignee sues in his own name.70 In cases stating the
contrary, a decision on the point was usually unnecessary.71
ASSIGNMENTS PENDENTE LITE
When a chose in action is assigned pendente lite, the codes usually
authorize the substitution of the assignee, but the action may be con-
tinued in the name of the original plaintiff, or sometimes of the assignee,
in the discretion of the court.72  A recent New York case before the
passage of the present practice act expressed the general view that a
motion to substitute the assignee is one of favor and not of right.7 3
Defendant cannot urge-as a bar to the action that it has been assigned
since commencement."4 The transferee acquires complete control over
the suit; the assignor may not dismiss it against his objection, nor even
obtain a substitution of attorneys.75
"But see Hawkins v. Mapes-Reeve Const. Co. (i9o4) I78 N. Y. 236, 242, 70
N. E. 783, 784, affirming 82 App. Div. 72, 81 N. Y. Supp. 794, that such assign-
ments are absolute "only upon the happening of.such contingencies."
" See note 68 supra; also Reynolds v. Louisville Ry. (1895) 143 Ind. 579, 40
N. E. 420; Farmers' Exch. Bank v. Crump (19o6) 116 Mo. App. 371, 92 S. W.
724; von Tobel v. S. & P. Mill Co. (1903) 32 Wash. 683, 73 Pac. 788. The
Washington court apparently requires a reassignment, not merely payment, before
suit by the assignor will be allowed.
1 Graham v. Light (19o6) 4 Calif. App. 4oo, 88 Pac. 373, where a reassignment
to the plaintiff was made on day of trial; Hawkins v. Mapes-Reeve Const. Co.,
supra note 69, where the primary question in this field was as to the effect of an
assignment pendente lite; Gross v. Heckert (1904) 120 Wis. 314, 97 N. W. 952,
where the debt was extinguished before commencement of the action. That under
the Mich. Jud. Act the assignor may sue, see Grubaugh v. Murphy Co. (1920) 209
Mich. 551, 177 N. W. 217. Under the Conn. code the assignee may sue only where
a sum still remains due on the debt secured greater than the assigned chose's value.
City Bank v. Thorp (i9o5) 78 Conn. 211, 218, 61 Atl. 428, 43o. Doubtless in
Connecticut the assignor could also sue under the rule noted supra. note 47.
" Whittier v. Visscher (1922) 189 Calif. 450, 209 Pac. 23; Richey Co. v. Mo.
Pac. R.y. (1923) 154 Minn. 154, 191 N. W. 395; Calif. Code Civ. Proc. 1915, sec.
385; Burns' Ann. Ind. Sts. 1914, sec. 272; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 7685; Mont.
Code Civ. Proc. 2922, sec. 9o86; Neb. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 8546; Ohio Gen. Code,
1910, sec. 11261; So. Dak. Rev. Code, i919, sec. 2317; N. Y. C. P. A. 1920, sec. 83.
' Helfand v. Mass. B. & Ins. Co. (292I, ist Dept.) 197 App. Div. 759, 189 N. Y.
Supp. 246.
"See Dolberry v. Trice (1873) 49 Ala. 207; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Sharp
(i92o, Tex. Civ. App.) 131 S. W. 614.
"'King v. Miller (19o8) 53 Ore. 53, 97 Pac. 542, aff'd 223 U. S. 505, 32 Sup. Ct
243; Harlan Douglas Co. v. Moncur (1912) i Calif. App. 177, 124 Pac. 2053;
Boqua v. Marshall (19o8) 88 Ark. 373, 114 S. W. 714.
That the rights of the assignee are purely statutory, see Burdick . & S. Co. v.
Tenenbaum (1923, Va.) 118 S. E. 502, 5o5, refusing substitution in the absence of
statute.
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A question as to who shall be nominal plaintiff arises when the
assignor pendente lite dies. The personal representative of the
deceased will not serve. The assignor had no interest; the estate can
have none.78 The action may continue in the name of the assignee if
that is desired, but there is no reason why it may not continue in the
name of the deceased assignor. As the California court has put it, "It
would seem to be immaterial whether the original party to the action
lives or dies."'77 The assignee should be substituted if he or the court so
desires. If no motion is made, the suit may proceed as though nothing
has happened. When a statute, however, specifically provides for
abatement of the action upon the death of a party unless the substitution
is made, it is at least safer to make the substitution.
SUB3ROGATION
When an insurance company pays a loss in whole or in part, or where,
as is provided by some workmen's compensation statutes,78 the legal
title to the employee's claim is transferred to the insurer on payment
by him, a situation is presented analogous to the assignment of a chose
in action.7 9  Consequently many courts have held that substantially the
same rules as those governing the assignment of debts should be applied
to these facts. They regard the subrogee as the real party in interest,
requiring him to sue alone when he has paid the entire loss, and to
make the insured a party when he has paid but a portion of it.
This is the general code rule when the insurer has paid the loss or
more. Judge Pound in a late New York case80 stated the prevailing
doctrine: "The action should have been brought in the name of the
insurance company alone. No other party has any interest in the
claim. The practice of joining the assured as plaintiff when it retains
no interest in the subject matter of the action is not to be commended."'
Formerly a subrogee had no standing in a court of law; his rights were
solely equitable.8 2  He could sue at law only in the name of the sub-
"8Reynolds v. Quaely (i877) 18 Kan. 361.
" Tuffree v. Stearns Ranchos Co. (1899) I24 Calif. 3o6, 309, 57 Pac. 69, 7o.
"E. g. Calif. Gen. Laws, 1915, Act 2144a, sec. 3i; Ill. Rev. Sts. 1921, ch. 48,
sec. i68. Ind. Acts, 1915, c. io6, sec. 13; Iowa Code Supp. 1913, sec. 2477m6b.
'nThat subrogation may be called an equitable assignment, see Bourquin, J. in
Gaugler v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry. (1912, D. Mont.) 197 Fed. 79.
*Lord & Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (192o) 230 N. Y. 132, I41, 129
N. E. 346, 348.
' See in accord Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Gt. Lakes Eng. Works (I9ii, C. C. A.
6th) 184 Fed. 426; Allen v. Chicago N. & W. Ry. Co. (1896) 94 Wis. 93, 68
N. W. 873; Employers' Liability. Assurance Corp. v. L & C. Traction Co. (1923,
Ind. App.) 139 N. E. 2o0, 2o2, aff'd 142 N. E. 856; see also Sloat-Darragh Co. v.
General Coal Co. (Ig2r, C. C. A. 6th) 276 Fed. 502, 507, applying same rule to
subrogee under guarantor's contract of indemnity. That the same result is reached
when there has been an actual assignment of the claim, see Swift & Co. v. Wabash
R. R. (91o) 149 Mo. App. 526, i31 S. W. 124.
" Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies (i9o5) see. 922, note 92.
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rogor.8" One or two code states, apparently forgetting that their pro-
cedure is a blending of law and equity, have been impressed by the
common law rule, so that we find them holding that the tort feasor can-
not defeat an action by the insured on the ground that he is not the
real party in interest, even though subrogation is admitted. 4 These
decisions overlook the fact that the insurer after full payment could
sue in equity before the codes and the insured could not. 5 The sub-
rogee thus had substantive rights which we cannot suppose the codes
were intended to take away from him. By the substantive law of the
case the insurer has the right of action; he is therefore the real party
in interest. The change wrought in denying the insured's right of
action is formal merely; it is exactly similar to the result reached by
the reformed procedure in dealing with the assignor of a chose in
action.8 6 No objection to this procedure can be based on the supposed
necessity of jury trial.8 7 We have already noticed that there has
always been a legal issue in these cases which has been and still may be
passed by on a jury.88 The defendant's constitutional right is not in
danger.
PARTIAL SUBROGATION
It. would seem perfectly natural to proceed with the analogy of sub-
rogation to assignments in those frequent cases where the insurance
8* Cf. statement of Connor, J., in Cunningham v. Seaboard Ry. (195o) 139 N. C.
427, 435, 51 S. E. IO29, IO32.
This practice still prevails in some common law jurisdictions. Long v. Kansas
City M. & B. R. R. (I9I0) 17o Ala. 635, 54 So. 62; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hann
(I9x6) 196 Ala. 234, 72 So. 48; Atlanta Cadillac Co. v. Manley (1923, Ga.) I16
S. E. 35; Pontiac Mut. F. & L. Ins. Co. v. Sheibley (1917) 279 Ill. 118, II6 N. E.
644.
"Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Hicklin (i909) 131 Ky. 624, 115 S. W. 752, 23 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 87o; Alaska Pac. S. S. Co. v. Sperry Flour Co. (917) 94 Wash. 227, 16z
Pac. 26; Foster v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (igio) 143 Mo. App. 547, 55r, 128 S. W. 36, 37.
" See note 82, supra.
"See supra, 265.
'See supra, 263..
'St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co. (i8gi) '139 U. S. 223, 235,
ri Sup. Ct. 554, 557; Holcombe v. Richmond & D. R. Co. (1887) 78 Ga. 776, 3
S. E. 755; Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. v. Frost (1865) 37 IIl. 333; Ide v. B. & M.
R. R. (19o9) 83 Vt. 66, 74 Ati. 401. These cases show that at common law the
action must be brought in the name of the subrogor, and that the jury passed upon
the question of negligence. In the Peoria case the court said, at p. 337, "The
recovery will be for the injury done to the property, and when the judgment is
obtained the court will determine as between the different companies how the
proceeds of the judgment are to be divided." i. e., the extent to which each is
subrogated.
That when the insured has settled with the tort feasor the insurer may sue in
his own name see Grain Dealers' M. F. Ins. Co. v. M. K. & T. Ry., (1916) 98
Kan. 344, 157 Pac. 1187; A. T. & S. F. 1?. R. v. Home Ins. Co. (1898) 89 Kan.
432, 53 Pac. 459; Powell v. Wake Water Co. (1916) 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426;
compare Monson v. Payne (1923) 199 Ky. 1O5, 25o S. W. 799, with Ill. Cent. R. R.
v. Hicklin, supra note 84.
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does not cover the loss, and to determine the real parties in interest
as with partial assignments. This theory would make both insurer
and insured necessary parties, permitting each to sue on joining
the other as plaintiff or defendant. This is the viewpoint of many
courts.8 9
The code states generally, however, do not share the conception here
contended for. An expression of Judge Dillon in an early case under
the Missouri Code 0 has been largely responsible. The learned judge
there said, "The suit, though for the use of the insurer, must be in the
name of the person whose property is destroyed. The wrongful act
was single and individual, and gives rise to but one liability. If one
insurer may sue, then, if there are a dozen, each may sue, and if the
aggregate amount of all the policies falls short of the actual loss, the
owner could sue for the balance. This is not permitted, and so it was
held nearly a hundred years ago, in a case whose authority has been
recognized ever since, both in Great Britain and in this country. Lon-
don Assur. Co. v. Sainsbury, 3 Doug. 245, 1783." The case referred
to by the learned judge is scarcely authority for the proposition for
which he cites it. There an evenly divided court held with reluctance,9'
it is true, that a partial insurer could not sue in his own name. But the
decision rests squarely on the ground that a subrogee even after pay-
ment of the entire loss, or indeed the assignee of a complete assignment,
could not sue in his own name at law.92 We have seen that this reason
failed when the real party in interest clause became operative. Now
rights of action are constantly transferred, and the transferee sues upon
them in his own name.93 Insurers now sue without objection in their
'Moore v. Taylor (igi6, 3d Dept.) 175 App. Div. 37, 39, 161 N. Y. Supp. 480,
481; Home Mit. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. (i8gi) 20 Or. 569, 26 Pac.
857; ,Allen-Wright v. Hines, Dir. Gen'l (1921) 34 Idaho, 90, 200 Pac. 889;
Omaha & R. V. Ry. v. Granite S. F. Ins. Co. (1898) 53 Neb. 514, 73 N. W. 950;
Pratt v. Radford (1881) 52 Wis. 114, 8 N. W. 6o6; Wunderlich v. Chic. & N. W.
Ry. (1896) 93 Wis. 132, 66 N. W. 1144; Toledo T. R. R. v. Mauk (igi8) 9 Ohio
App. 438. Many of these cases describe insurer and insured as "joint owners of
the cause of action."
A few states appear to permit intervention by the insurance company to protect
its rights, which seems to be an unnecessary burden on it. See Shawnee Fire Ins.
Co. v. Cosgrove (ig1) 85 Kan. 296, 116 Pac. 819; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v.
Falk (19oo) 62 Ohio St. 297, 56 N. E. 1020.
"0 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hann'bal & St. J. R. R. (1874) Fed. Cas. no. 96. -
'Lord Mansfield said, "My leaning is strongly in favor of the plaintiff...
It is a great hardship for which I cannot find a remedy." 3 Dougl. at p. 253.
"Lord Mansfield: "I take it to be a maxim that as against the person sued the
action cannot be transferred. As between the parties themselves the law has long
supported it for the benefit of commerce, but the assignee must sue in the name of
the assignor. . . . There is no instance of an action in the name of the insurer,
while numberless actions have been brought by owners of ships for damage done
by other ships, where many of them must have been insured .... It is better that
the general rule of law should prevail, that as against the person sued the right of
action cannot be transferred."
" See supra, p. 263.
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own names when they have paid the whole loss.9 4 There can be little
doubt from Lord Mansfield's remarks as to what his decision would have
been had he been able to avail himself of the provisions of modem codes.
Judge Dillon's objection to splitting is readily answered, and in the same
fashion as that objection was met in discussing partial assignments. 95
Splitting was never an objection in equity, since the additional partiesmight be cited in, and with the freedom as to parties in equity incorpor-
ated in the codes, it cannot be an objection under present practice. Theinsured may be made plaintiff or defendant; all interests may be deter-
mined in one action. Nevertheless, Judge Dillon's opinion has taken
root in our law and is the view of most code states.96
THE EXCEPTION AS TO TRUSTEES
The fact that the codifiers felt it necessary to add to the real party
in interest clause the exception that "an executor or administrator, a
trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute,
may sue without joining with him the persons for whose benefit the
suit is prosecuted,"9 7 has added greatly to the confusion of the subject.
Possibly it is the largest single cause of such confusion. Why did they
add this exception if the one with the legal right might sue anyway as
a real party in interest? Did they not mean the beneficial and sub-
stantial owner as distinguished from the mere holder of the legal right?
But as we have seen, after perhaps a little hesitation the courts came
to the broader conception of the real party in interest, refusing to limit
its meaning to the equitable and beneficial owner merely.98 They were
practically compelled so to do, or else a provision designed to aid in
the liberalization of pleading would have turned out vastly to restrict it.Their view was, it seems clear, the only sound one to take. Was it,
however, different from the plan of the original codifiers? It is not
thought that it was. The codifiers state as their purpose to adopt the
equity view that he who had the right, should be the one to sue. Fur-
tler they desired to adopt a more liberal rule as to parties than pre-
vailed at law.9 Both of these purposes are inconsistent with a re-
stricted definition of the real party in interest. Again the form of the
"See supra, p. 270.
'See supra, p. 266." See Powell v. Wake Water Co., supra note" 88, at pp. 296, 297, 88 S. E. 430;So. Bell Tel. Co. v. Watts (1895, C. C. A. 4th) 66 Fed. 460; Regan v. N. Y. &N. E. R. R. (89) 6o Conn. 124, 22 At. 503; Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Shutt(i9o9) 24 Okla. 96, 104 Pac. 51; and see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Ry.(1898) 74 Mo. App. io6, 1r5. As to the suggestion that the insured may suealone after payment as the trustee of an express trust, see Broderick v. PugetSound T. L. & P.- Co. (191s) 86 Wash. 399, 150 Pac. 616; Pratt v. Radford(1881) 52 Wis. 114, 8 N. W. 6o6, expressing what seems to be a far sounder view.
" Supra note i.
*See supra, p. 264.
" Supra notes 2 and 20.
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original provision is slightly different from that which appeared in the
later codes. Instead of the executor, trustee and person authorized
by statute appearing as exceptions in th6 same section with the real
party in interest provision, an entirely separate section declares that
such person may sue without joining with him the persons for whose
benefit the suit is prosecuted. 00 This idea that the fiduciary may sue
alone, is at least as prominent as that the fiduciary may sue. It seems
reasonable to suppose that this provision does not indicate a restricted
view of the real party in interest, but was put in out of excess of caution
to make it clear(a) that the adoption of the equity rule was not intended
to prevent any legal title holder from suing and (b) also that it was
not intended to compel a joinder in such case. In general, it would seem
that a person in the excepted class is also a real party in interest, but
it is conceivable that cases may be found where this is not so.101
The, presence of the exception has had not only the effect noted of
tending to restrict the meaning of the real party in interest provision,
but has had the opposite "tendeicy of leading some courts to allow per-
sons to sue who formerly had no right of action either at law or in
equity. Of course the technical trustee could sue in his own name
before the reform of procedure and he still may do so. 10 2  But an
express trust, technically speaking, had to be created by the direct and
positive act of the parties, by some writing, deed, or will.103 Some
statutes using the term were construed to apply only to trusts in land.
For example, in New York it was at first supposed that the phrase
"0 See supra, note i7. In the'later code, Bliss' N. Y. Civ. Proc. 1913, sec. 449,
N. Y. C. P. A. 1920, sec. 2IO, the excepting clause is made a part of the same
sentence containing the real party in interest provision.
" Such a case might be where a trust which _has become dry is not yet formally
terminated. At common law the trustee would still be the one to sue. Under code
pleading it seems that the beneficiary should sue instead, as the real party in
interest even without a formal transfer of the trust property to him. Cf.
McConos v. Covenant Mut. L. In.s. Co. (1874) 56 Mo. 573. Yet the formal
trustee could still sue under the provision. The assignor of a chose in action might
perhaps have been treated in the same way, but since he has transferred away his
interest, it is proper to hold that he is not even a formal trustee. In Considerant v.
Brisbane, supra note i8, it is said that there had been some doubt until the amend-
ment adding the provision as to the agent was passed whether a factor or similar
agent who could have sued at common law was permitted to sue under the codes.
In People's 0. & F. Co. v. C. & W. C. Ry. (19o9) 83 S. C. 53o, 65 S. E. 733, it
was held that one who had assigned his claim to three different assignees might
sue as trustee of an express trust.
See Perkins v. Gross (924, Ariz.) 224 Pac. 62o; Fransham v. Tow Bros.
(1923) 196 Iowa, io82, 196 N. W. 71. That when the trustee has the legal title
the averment of trusteeship may be regarded as surplusage, see Koch v. Story
(I9io) 47 Colo. 335, 338, 107 Pac. 1093.
That the exception in favor of the trustee is permissive only, see Hubbell v.
Medbury (1873) 53 N. Y. 98; for cases where cestui and trustee join, see Citizens'
Trust Co. v. Tindle (1917) 272 Mo. 682, 199 S. W. 1025; Gulbranson-Dickinson
Co. v. Hopk*ns (i929) 170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93.
" Considerant v. Brisbane, supra note 18.
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referred to trusts of realty authorized by the Revised Statutes, and
there called express trusts.1 4  Shortly, however, the New York courts
decided to include in the term all contracts where one person acts for
or on behalf of another. 0 5 In 1851 this definition was added to the
statute so as to provide that a trustee of an express trust, within the
meaning of the section, shall be construed to include "a person with
whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit of
another."'  This gloss was carried over into the codes of practically
all the code states. In many, including the New York Civil Practice
Act of 1920, it appears as a separate exception rather than as a defini-
tion of trustee of an express trust.'0 7  In general the codes have con-
strued the words "express trust" with great liberality. 108
Thus we find it said that the trust need not be formal or even in writ-
ing.1 9 On special demurrer a mere statement that plaintiff is trustee is
good; naming the befheficiary, or showing an express trust is not
required."l0  A foreign executor, or a trustee under foreign law,
has been allowed to sue alone under the code provision."' Agents for
disclosed or undisclosed principals have made great use of the theory
that they are trustees of express trusts, so that the fact that an agent for
a disclosed principal is not generally considered the real party in inter-
est does not debar him from suing if the contract is considered to be
made in his name.1 2 An assignee for collection or suit is sometimes
... Grinnell, Minturn & Co. v. Schmidt (i85o, N. Y.) 4 Super. Ct. 706, 709.
"0 1 Ibid. at p. 71o.
'o' N. Y. Code, I85I, sec. 113; Considerant v. Brisbane, supra note I8.
10 N. Y. C. P. A. 1g2o, sec. 21o; see codes collected, Sunderland, Cases on Code
Pleading (1913) 25.
"' See cases cited infra.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. B. & B. Co. (I899) 105 Ky. 253, 48 S. W. io74;
contra: Wiehtuechter v. Miller (i918) 276 Mo. 322. 208 S. W. 39.
"'Sansom v. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. (I911) 144 Ky. 555, 139 S. W. 778. A
contract must be alleged where the plaintiff sues as a third party. Novick v.
Washington (igig, Sup. Ct. Tr. T.) 176 N. Y. Supp. 387, 388.
"Doe v. Ten*no C. & L Co. (i9o6) 43 Wash. 523, 86 Pac. 938; Kokusai etc. v.
Argos Merc. Corp. (1922, C. C. A. 6th) 280 Fed. 700. cert. denied, 42 Sup. Ct. 463.
It seems clear that the question here involved is one of the relations between states
rather than of pleading. The general rule is that foreign fiduciaries have no legal
right to sue without qualification before the court of the forum but are often
permitted to do so upon principles of comity between states. i Woerner, AInerican
Law of Administration (3d ed. 1923) 558-6o. For a similar rule as to foreign
receivers see Mahon v. Ongley Electric Co. (1898) x56 N. Y. 196, 5o N. E. 805; 1
Clark. Receivers (1918) sec. 427.
"' Kelley-Clarke Co. v. Leslie (1923) 61 Calif. App. 559, 215 Pac. 699; Harris v.
Clayton (1921) 186 Calif. 445. 199 Pac. 776; Owen v. Harriott (911) 47 Ind.
App. 359 94 N. E. 591; Middleton v. Wohlgemuth (igio, 2d Dept.) 141 App. Div.
678, 126 N. Y. Supp, 734; Gray v. Cavalliotis (1921, E. D. N. Y.) 276 Fed. 565;
Lewis v. Home Ins. Co. (1922. Ist Dept.) 199 App. Div. 556, 192 N. Y. Supp. 170,
aff'd 181 N. Y. Supp. 839 (warehouseman); see also 41 L. R. A. (N. s.) 641,
note; Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) 2028; confra: Perry v. Swanner (19o9)
15o N. C. 141, 63 S. E. 61I; Chapman v. McLawhorn (igog) i5o N. C. 166. 63
S. E. 721.
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held the trustee of an express trust ;113 and the pledgee of a note after
default of the pledgor has been put in the same class. 1 14  The clause
has been extended also to include a partner holding funds for the firm
or contracting for it."'
From these examples it will be seen that the exact extent of the
clause is not clear on the authorities. Some textwriters have urged
that a halt should be called when the trust is not express ;1" but it is
obvious that the courts have not halted there. The solution would seem
to be found, as it is found in the case of the real party in interest, in
requiring the plaintiff to have some interest which would have entitled
him to sue before the codes. 17
By no means all of the difficult problems concerning the real party
in interest have been considered above."' It is believed, however, that
the principles that have been developed here will point the way to the
solution of such problems. In ascertaining who is the real party in
interest to be the plaintiff in an action, the method is to discover the
person who by substantive law has a right of action on the facts in
issue. If one has a right of action on equitable principles, he is now
the real party in interest in a case normally to be tried to the court;
if one has a right of action on legal principles, he is now the real party
in interest in a jury case. Neither can be considered exclusively the
real party in interest on the cause, for each is such party as to the
right of action which the law gives him.
"Barrett v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. (1920) i9o Iowa, 509, t75 N. W. 950; Citizenr"
Trust Co. v. Tindle, supra note 1O2. It is believed simpler to think of such an
assignee as the real party in interest.
" Winnemucca S. B. & T. Co. v. Corbeil (igig) 42 Nev. 378, 178 Pac. 23.
"Davdge v. Guardian Trust Co. (i9o9, 3d Dept.) 136 App. Div. 78, 120 N. Y.
Supp. 628, reversed on other grounds 203 N. Y. 331, 96 N. E. 751; Weber v.
Columbia Amusement Co. (1914, ist Dept) i6o App. Div. 835, 146 N. Y. Supp.
53; but see Natter v. Blanchard (1912, Ist Dept.) 153 App. Div. 814, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 969.
'" Pomeroy, Code Remedies (3d ed. 1894) sec. 1oo; Hepburn, 3o Cyc. 9o.
n" While there is some language in Considerant v. Brisbane, supra note 18, and
cases which follow it (see Gray v. Cavalliotis, supra note 112) that an agent may
sue though the contract was such that he would not have been permitted to before
the codes, the actual decisions show that in general the courts have not extended
the doctrine to quite that point. The courts have tended to hold that the agent
must be one with whom the contract was legally made, not one who merely made
the contract for his principal. See Considerant v. Brisbane, supra note 18; Gray v.
Cavalliotis, supra note 112. Thus the New York doctrine, set forth by Considerant
v. Brisbane, is to that effect. In Spencer v. Standard C. & M. Corp. (924) 237
N.' Y. 479, 143 N. E. 65r, a mere agent who could not have sued at law or equity
is not permitted to sue under the Code as trustee of an express trust, and for that
reason. Albany & R. Co. v. Lundberg (1887) 121 U. S. 451, 7 Sup. Ct. 958.
Hence this exception, if it be one, to the general principle that the codifiers did not
plan to change substantive law is one of very small compass. See Mechem, op. eit.
2028. Compare also McFadden v. Clark (ii6) io6 S. C. 495, 91 S. E. 799;
Mitchell v. St. Mary (1897) 148 Ind. II1, 47 N. E. 224.
"' See, e. g. suits by the equitable owner of realty or personalty.
